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DENIAL OF EXIT PERMITS TO ALIENS DURING A
NATIONAL EMERGENCY
The present international situation has engendered a method of coping
with aliens which is unique for a period in which there is no formal declara-
tion of war with the alien's country. This addition to the usual methods
of exclusion and deportation consists of indefinite detention within the
State's borders of aliens who allegedly are dangerous to the national in-
terest. During and after the Korean fighting, the United States Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service prevented certain Chinese nationals who
had received scientific and medical training from returning to Communist
China, on the ground that the aliens' departure would be prejudicial to the
interests of the United States.' This new policy raises two important
questions: (1) whether detention is justifiable under the principles of in-
ternational law; and (2) whether there are any constitutional or other
safeguards which guide the use of the detention process.
DETENTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
A settled principle of international law requires a State to deal justly
with foreign residents.2 The propriety of a restraint on resident aliens
depends on whether the detaining nation is at war with or enjoys peace-
time relations with the alien's country. Prevention of an alien's departure
during peacetime has received little comment from the international law
textwriters. One writer has stated, however, that:
"Since a State holds only a territorial and not a personal supremacy
over an alien within its boundaries, it can never, under any circum-
stances, prevent him from leaving its territory, provided he has ful-
filled his local obligations, such as payment of rates and taxes, of fines,
of private debts, and the like." 3
The United States has alluded to this principle on two occasions in deny-
ing the right of foreign countries to prevent the return of American citizens.
1. The Immigration and Naturalization Service revealed the detentions on March
24, 1954. The Chinese had come to this country under Nationalist Chinese auspices
to continue their studies. N.Y. Times, March 24, 1954, p. 29, col. 5. On May 29
the State Department press officer announced that 4500 Chinese students were in the
United States when China entered the Korean War. Of these, only 450 wished
to return to Communist China, and 120 were denied permission to leave. Four appli-
cations for departure were denied after October 1953. Those detained in the United
States have complete freedom of movement and are free to accept any position of
employment. N.Y. Times, May 29, 1954, p. 2, col. 5. On April 2, 1955, the State
Department announced that all but approximately six of the detained Chinese
students had been granted permission to return to Communist China. However,
the granting of permission was a political measure invoked in the hope of inducing
the Communist Chinese government to free Americans now imprisoned in China.
N.Y. Times, April 3, 1955, § 1, p. 1, col. 1.
For the statute and regulations under which the detention was implemented, see
text at notes 40-42 infra.
2. BRmLy, LAw OF NATiONs 203-18 (4th ed. 1949).
3. 1 OPPENHEim, INTRNATiONAL LAw 629-30 (6th ed., Lauterpacht, 1947).
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In 1915, in an instruction to the Consul General at Beirut, the State De-
partment proclaimed that the Turkish Government had no right to inter-
fere with the departure from Turkey of naturalized American citizens who
had been Turkish subjects at one time.4 In 1932, the State Department
instructed the Teheran legation to inform Persian officials that they were
without right in conditioning their grant of an exit visa to an American
citizen on his transfer of a power of attorney to a Persian resident or in
attempting in any manner to prevent the American's departure.5 Thus, the
United States' refusal to permit the Chinese citizens to return home ap-
pears to be in direct contradiction to the traditional peacetime international
rule.
In sharp contrast to the peacetime rule is the recognized right to detain
enemy aliens during wartime.6 Historically, enemy aliens had no rights
whatsoever and their goods were subject to confiscation.7 Although sev-
eral treaties were made during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to
provide for the repatriation of enemy non-combatants within a reasonable
time after the outbreak of war," the practice of detaining such persons was
widespread during both the First and Second World Wars.9 Both Great
Britain 10 and the United States," although they repatriated some enemy
aliens,' 2 relied primarily on detention as a method of protecting national
security interests.' 3 The courts of both countries cooperated with the
executive departments in matters concerning enemy aliens and generally
refrained from judicial inquiry into action taken.14  The United States
4. 3 HACKWoRTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 198 (1942).
5. 3 id. at 550.
6. The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, Art. 35, provides that enemy aliens may be prevented
from leaving a nation if such departure conflicts with the national interest. Unless
prevented by security reasons, an explanation for the detention must be given to the
protecting state. For the general rules regarding enemy aliens, see 2 OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 306-18 (7th ed., Lauterpacht, 1952).
7. McNAiR, LEGA. EFFEcTs OF WAR 37 (3d ed. 1948); PAGE, WAR AND ALIEN
ENEMIES 10-12 (1914).
8. PAGE, WAR AND ALIEN ENEMIES 10 (1914); 2 OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 306.
9. See 2 OPPENHEIm, op. cit. supra note 6, at 307-09.
10. Section 1 (b) of the British Aliens Restriction Act of 1914, 4 & 5 GEO. 5,
c. 12, provided for restrictions on the embarkation of any alien. Order in Council
of August 5, 1914, pursuant to this Act, restricted the embarkation of enemy aliens
to approved ports with permission. PAGE, WAR AND ALiEN ENEMIES 51-56 (1914) ;
PULLING, MANUAL OF EmERGENcY LEGISLATION 70-72 (1914) (Consolidation Order of
Sept. 9, 1914).
11. See, e.g., 1 STAT. 577 (1848) (authorizing the President to direct the con-
finement of enemy aliens). Implementing this was the Presidential Proclamation
of December 11, 1917, providing for custody of aliens who did not obey controls es-
tablished by presidential injunction. 40 STAT. 1729-31 (1919).
12. Kemper, The Enemy Alien, Problem in the Present War, 34 Am. J. INT'L
L. 443 (1940). The United States' policy in World War I was to deport as many
dangerous aliens as possible. REP. ATr'y GEN. 26-27 (1918).
13. See Hoover, Alien Enemy Confrol, 29 IowA L. Rxv. 396 (1944) ; Kemper,
supra note 12, at 443-48; Harrison, Alien Enemies, 13 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 196 (1942).
14. Brandon, Legal. Control Over Resident Enemy Aliem in Time of War in
the United States and the United Kingdom, 44 Am. J. INT'L L. 385-86 (1950);
Hoover, supra note 13, at 398-99.
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courts will review the executive act only to determine the constitutionality
of the applicable statute and to insure that the executive had jurisdiction
under the statute to perform the act being reviewed. 15
Working within this traditional wartime concept, one could argue
that the detention of the Chinese while the Korean fighting continued was
merely an application of the rule as to enemy aliens.16 By usual definitions
an enemy alien is one who is the subject of a foreign nation which is in a
formal state of war with the detaining State; 17 the individual becomes an
enemy alien with the formal outbreak of war.18 This apparently was recog-
nized by the United States in its practice both in 1917 and 1941 of apply-
ing no restrictions to nationals of potentially enemy nations until the
declaration of war, although many of these nationals were under close
surveillance for some time prior to that declaration.' 9 During the Korean
conflict no formal declaration of war was ever made, and indeed Communist
China repeatedly asserted its lack of official participation. Therefore,
the traditional definition of war would have to be modernized in order to
regard Chinese citizens as enemy aliens during that period. However, in
view of the lack of a formal declaration of war prior to and during present-
day military action, there seems to be no reason why international legal
principles should not recognize the Korean and other similar "incidents"
as war and as giving rise to the legal consequences of a war.20 Never-
15. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948); Minotto v. Bradley, 252 Fed.
600 (N.D. Ill. 1918). See also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 775 (1950) ;
Citizens League v. Clark, 155 F.2d 290, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1946). An enemy alien has
no right to judicial review as to whether he received a fair hearing. Ludecke v.
Watkins, supra. See also Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799 condemning the
Alien and Sedition laws for failing to distinguish alien friends from alien enemies.
COMMAGER, DOcuMENTs OF AmERcAN HIsToRY 178-84 (1949).
16. See Comment, 67 HARv. L. Ray. 341, 343 (1953).
17. Kemper, supra note 12, at 443; BATY & MORGAN, WAR: ITS CONDUCT AND
LEAL R S.s 306 (1915).
18. See 2 OPPENHEiM, op. cit. supra note 6, at 306.
19. REP. ATr'Y GEN. 57, 59, 60 (1917); RaP. Arr'y GEN. 14 (1941); Hoover,
supra note 13, at 399.
20. A determination that enemy alien status could exist in the absence of a de-
clared war would not be entirely unprecedented. In 1941 a federal court, while hold-
ing that an Italian was not an enemy alien for the purpose of incapacity to sue since
he was a citizen of a country with which the United States was not at war, recognized
that a formal declaration of war was not necessary to create an enemy alien status
if the condition of war was tacitly recognized by acts of the political branches of the
Government. Verano v. De Angelis Coal Co., 41 F. Supp. 954 (M.D. Pa. 1941).
See also Hamilton v. McClaughry, 136 Fed. 445 (C.C. Kan. 1905), in which the
Boxer Rebellion was found to be a war for the purpose of validating a courtmartial
under Article of War 58 (offenses in time of war). Furthermore, termination of an
enemy alien status depends on recognition by the political branch that the condition
of war no longer exists, even though the actual fighting has ceased. Ludecke v.
Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 168-70 (1948). The United States Alien Enemy Act re-
lated to nationals of any state at war with the United States or threatening invasion
or predatory incursion against the United States. 40 STAT. 531 (1918), 50 U.S.C. § 21
(1952). See also 2 OPPENHEiM, op. cit. supra note 6, at 299, where the author states:
"It is certain that States which deliberately order the commencement of hostilities
without a previous declaration of war or a qualified ultimatum commit an interna-
tional delinquency; but they are nevertheless engaged in war. Again, war is actually
in existence if the other party forcibly resists acts of force undertaken by a State by
way of reprisals, or during a pacific blockade, or an interrention. Now, in all these
and similar cases, all the laws of warfare must find application, for a war is still
war in the eyes of International Law. .. ."
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theless, the continuance of alien detention after the Korean war had ceased
cannot be justified under this theory.
Even though the post-Korean detention cannot be ruled legal under
traditional wartime or peacetime rules, a third hypothesis remains to be
considered. No matter what name is to be accorded it, the present inter-
national situation has little similarity to the previous era in which the terms
"war" and "peace" were adequate to describe any relationship between
nations. The concept of an indefinite national emergency seems not to have
been contemplated. In 1921, the Attorney General stated that the terms
war and peace were "mutually exclusive" and the affirmation of one neces-
sarily was a denial of the other.21 Thus, international law has developed
no rules for situations and relationships, as exist at present, which cannot
be termed either wartime or peacetime.2 In the sole case on the appellate
level testing the legality of the detention of one of the Chinese citizens, the
Government argued that:
"The suggestion that peacetime concepts must be applied to the world
of 1953 is unrealistic. Despite the absence of a declared war, the hot
and cold conflicts that engage the United States all over the globe,
and the gigantic efforts we are expending to assure our safety, in-
delibly have marked this as a time of emergency." 2
The most recent expressions of international thought stem from United
Nations action following World War II. In 1948 the General Assembly
adopted a Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which Article 13(c)
provides that "everyone has the right to leave any country, including his
own, and to return to his country." 24 This absolute declaration was passed
after consideration of proposals advocating restrictions on the freedom of
movement for security reasons.2 However, in 1952 an indication that the
traditional peacetime absolute right to leave a country is no longer practical
arose in the United Nations' Draft Covenant on Human Rights. Article
10(1) provides:
21. 32 Ops. Arr'y GEN. 509 (1921).
22. "The question may be posed whether it would not be useful to break away
from the old dichotomous approach, acknowledging in law as in fact that there is a
third legal status intermediate between peace and war." "The basic question to which
these suggestions are addressed is whether our concepts, our terminology, our law,
have kept pace with the evolution of international relations. . . ." Jessup, Should
International Law Recognize an Intermediate Status Between Peace and War?, 48
Am. J. INT'L L. 98, 100, 102 (1954). See also GRoB, THE RELATIVITY OF WAR AND
PEAcE (1949), particularly pp. 15-36.
23. Brief for Appellee, p. 18, Han-Lee Mao v. Brownell, 207 F2d 142 (D.C.
Cir. 1953).
24. 1948-49 YEAPMoOK OF THE UNIrz NATIONS 535-37. Of course, the Declara-
tion does not have any binding legal force but is intended as "a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations," according to its preamble. The Declara-
tion was adopted by the General Assembly on December 10, 1948. Id. at 537.
25. See U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.4/SR. 9 (1947). Probably of some influence on the
draftsmen was the proposal in LAUTERPACET, AN INTENATioNAL- BILL OF THE
RIGHTS OF MAN 129 (1945): "The right of emigration and expatriation shall not
be denied."
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"Subject to any general law of the state concerned which provides for
such reasonable restrictions as may be necessary to protect the national
security, public safety, health or morals or the rights and freedom of
others, consistent with the other rights recognized in this Covenant:
"(b) Everyone shall be free to leave any Country, including his
own." 2
6
This rule appears to be a clear recognition of the fact that interests of na-
tional security now may require a limitation on an alien's freedom to depart
from a country. Detention would not seem to be an unreasonable restric-
tion when it is for the purpose of preventing a hostile nation from utilizing
the talents or knowledge of the repatriated citizens in a manner inimical
to the interests of the detaining State; and this is the basis of the State
Department's refusal to permit the return of the Chinese citizens 27 But
since detention is an extreme measure and imposes a great hardship on the
affected alien, adoption of the practice must be guarded carefully to insure
that its use in each instance is a reasonable one. Thus, it is necessary to
examine what safeguards surround the implementation of the detention
policy of the State Department.
SAFEGUARDS SURROUNDING DETENTION PROCEDURE
Since the term "person" in the Fifth Amendment is deemed to include
an alien who is in the United States, as well as a citizen,2 8 it is relevant
to consider the scope of the citizen's right to emigrate. Many scholars,
beginning with Cicero, have declared that a citizen has the right to leave
his country.29 Constitutions of several nations have recognized this prin-
26. U.N. EcoNomIC AND SoCIAL COUNCIL OFF. REc., 14th Sess., Supp. No. 4
(Doc. No. E/2256) (1952). For a summary of and citations to discussion, see id.
at 28-29.
27. See regulations cited in text at notes 41-42 infra.
28. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953). See also Bridges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (concurring opinion). See text at note 49 and
note 49 infra.
29. Cicero stated that every citizen had the privilege either to remain in or to
leave his State if he so wishes. CICERO, PLEA FOR BA.nus xiii. Grotius found a
right to leave one's country from the citizen's contract with society, unless an obliga-
tion such as military service or a debt of money remained unfulfilled, or unless a
whole company wished to leave at once, to the country's depletion. GRoTrus, DE
JuRE BELLI Ac :PAcIs bk. 2, at 253-54 (Libri Tres, Kelsey transl. 1925). Pufendorf
also found a general right to leave, subject to the special interest of the State.
PUFENDORF, ON THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS bk. 8, at 1348-52 (Oldfather
transl. of 1688 ed. 1934). See also 1 BL. COMM. 134. Vattel, finding a right to
emigrate in the contractual nature of society, would generally limit it to cases not
endangering the welfare of the State, although where the State was not fulfilling
its obligation to the citizen he considered the right to leave absolute. VATrEL,
LE DROIT DES GENs. bk. 1, at 88-91 (Fenwick transl. of 1758 ed. 1916). Francis
Lieber, nineteenth century liberal, stressed the importance of the right to move out of
a country at will, subject to limitation in cases of special hardship to the State.
1 LumER, MANUAL OF PoLmrCAL ETHICS 195 et seq. (Woolsey ed. 1911). The con-
sensus of this political thought is that the State has the burden to justify any re-
striction on a citizen's right to leave his country.
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ciple,30 and the United States often has asserted that it is a basic right of
every citizen.31 However, as a practical matter, the right of a citizen to
leave the United States at present is controlled strictly by the passport re-
quirements.32 The McCarran Act provides that it shall be unlawful for a
citizen to leave without a valid passport if the President declares a national
emergency and proclaims that the interests of the United States require
restrictions, in addition to those imposed elsewhere in the Act, on the de-
parture of persons from this country.3 3  The necessary declaration 34 and
proclamation 1 have been made. Under the Passport Act 36 and regula-
tions, 3 7 the Secretary of State "in his discretion" may refuse to issue a
passport. However, in Bauer v. Acheson3 s a three-judge district court
held that the right to emigrate is an attribute of personal liberty within
the Fifth Amendment and that, therefore, the State Department does not
30. CoNsT. or AusTRIA, April 24, 1934, Art. 18(1); CONST. OF CZECHOSLOVAK
REPUBLIC, Feb. 29, 1920, Art 110; CONST. OF THE UNITED STATES OF MEXICO,
Jan. 31, 1917, as amended to November 5, 1942, Art. 11, contained in ILO, CONSTrru-
TIONAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING SOCIAL AND ECONOmIC POLICY (1944). Many
post-World War II constitutions guarantee the right to emigrate, e.g., Italy, Bolivia,
Venezuela and Nicaragua.
31. In 1949 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a Resolution recom-
mending that the Soviet Union withdraw measures whereby Soviet wives of foreign
citizens were being prevented from leaving the Soviet Union. The Resolution, intro-
duced by Chile because of the detention of a Russian wife of a Chilean citizen,
was supported by the United States on the ground of a basic right to leave a country.
Resolution 385 (III), April 25, 1949, adopted U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFF. REC.,
3d Sess., 2d pt., 157 (1949). The legal basis alleged for the Resolution was: Pre-
amble to U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 3, 55(c), and International Draft of Human
Rights, providing a right to leave the country and to marry. See text of report,
U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF. REC., 3d Sess., 2d pt., annexes 17 (1949).
An exchange of communications between the State Department and the Soviet
Union between October, 1949 and February, 1950, concerning the Soviet's refusal
to grant exit permits to American citizens in Russia, assumes the right of a citizen
to depart. Quoting the Universal Declaration, Art. 13, a State Department press
release commented: "The United States Government holds this to be one of the
most basic of human rights and deplores the unwillingness of the Soviet Government
to permit persons possessing both American and Soviet citizenship to reside where
they themselves desire." Reported in 22 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 433-41 (1950).
Numerous state constitutions have guaranteed the right of emigration, beginning
with the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, clause 15.
Judicial decisions have affirmed the right of free egress from, or transit through,
a state. Joseph v. Randolph, 71 Ala. 499 (1882) ; Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270
(1900). See Note, Depression Migrants and the States, 53 HARv. L. REV. 1031,
1034 (1940); Bowman, The United States Citizens' Privilege-State Residence, 10
B.U.L. REv. 459 (1930).
32. See Comment, Passport Refusals for Political Reasons: Constitutional Issues
and Judicial Review, 61 YALE L.J. 171 (1952).
33. 66 STAT. 190 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1185(b) (1952). This provision contains
the same language as section 224 of the Passport Act, which the provision superseded.
40 STAT. 559 (1918).
34. The emergency was declared in 1941, Presidential Proclamation No. 2487,
6 Fan. Raos. 2617 (1941), and for this purpose is still in effect. Presidential
Proclamation No. 3004, 18 FED. REG. 489 (1953).
35. Presidential Proclamation No. 2523, 6 FED. REG. 5821 (1941).
36. 44 STAT. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C. § 2 11a (1952).
37. 22 CODE FED. REGS. § 51.75 (1949).
38. 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952).
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have absolute discretion to deny a passport. The court required that the
applicant be given notice and opportunity to be heard.8 9
The McCarran Act also provides a criminal penalty for aliens who
leave the country after a declaration of national emergency and a proclama-
tion of the need for additional restrictions on departure from the country.40
The pertinent regulations provide that:
"No permit to depart . . . shall be issued to an alien if the issuing
authority has any reason to believe that the departure will be preju-
dicial to the interests of the United States." 41
The departure of an alien is prejudicial if, inter alz: (1) he possesses and
is likely to disclose information concerning the national defense of the
United States or its allies; (2) he is leaving for the purpose of engaging
in, or is likely to engage in, activities likely to impede or delay the national
defense of the United States or its allies; or (3) he is departing for the
purpose of organizing or directing war or rebellion against the United
States.
Since the resident alien has the same Fifth Amendment right to pro-
cedural due process as a citizen,43 detention of an alien in this country
should be preceded by notice and the opportunity to be heard. In Han-
Lee-Mao v. Brownell" plaintiff, a Chinese alien, desired to return to his
native country in 1951. He had studied for four years in the United
States and had earned a master's degree in oceanography. Although he
received no hearing other than a brief interrogation by an immigration
inspector, plaintiff was denied an exit permit on the ground that if he
returned to Communist China his scientific training and knowledge might
be used to impede the national defense efforts of the United States. A
three-judge district court held that the pertinent provision of the Mc-
39. Following this decision the State Department issued regulations providing that
in security cases a passport applicant be given a hearing and be notified of the
reason for the refusal as specifically as the Department feels that security limitations
permit. 22 CoDE FaI. REGs. §§51.137-51.139 (Cum. Supp. 1952), 102 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 539 (1954). See also Nathan v. Dulles, 23 U.S.L. WEEK 2453 (D.D.C. Feb.
28, 1955) (memorandum opinion); Clark v. Dulles, 23 U.S.L. WEEK 2453 (D.D.C.
Feb. 28, 1955) (memorandum opinion).
40. "When the United States is at war or during the existence of any national
emergency proclaimed by the President . . . and the President shall find that the
interests of the United States require that restrictions and prohibitions in addition to
those provided otherwise than by this section be imposed upon the departure of
persons from and their entry into the United States, and shall make public proclama-
tion thereof, it shall, until otherwise ordered by the President or the Congress, be
unlawful-(l) for any alien to depart from . . . or attempt to depart from . . .
the United States except under such reasonable rules, regulations, and orders . . .
as the President may prescribe." 66 STAT. 190 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (a) (1952).
This provision contains the same language as section 223 of the Passport Act, which
this provision superseded. 40 STAT. 559 (1918), as amended, 55 STAT. 252 (1941).
41. 8 CODE Fa. Rms. § 175.24 (1949).
42. 8 CODE FFD. REs. § 17525 (1949). The other grounds for refusing a permit
to depart are also included in this section.
43. See note 28 supra.
44. 207 F.2d 142 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
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Carran Act was constitutional, over the objection that the standards were
void for vagueness and that the statute was an invalid delegation of legis-
lative power.45 Although the executive branch is given broad discretion
in determining what aliens shall be permitted to leave the country, it seems
that this decision would have been affirmed by the Supreme Court, which
has upheld similar grants of broad discretionary power.46
The case was then returned to a single-judge district court which dis-
missed plaintiff's claim that the Attorney General had acted outside the
scope of his statutory authority and thereby had violated plaintiff's con-
stitutional right.47 On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, it was held that due process required that a full and.fair hear-
ing be granted and that, therefore, the statute must be read as providing
for such a hearing.48 The court reasoned correctly that an alien need not
be a permanent resident in order to be protected by the Fifth Amendment.49
One problem which the Court of Appeals did not discuss is how
specific the Government must be in presenting its reasons for denial of an
exit permit. It appears that Han-Lee-Mao was cognizant of all of the
facts on which the refusal of his request was based, 0 but there are many
instances in which an applicant may be ignorant of the grounds for deten-
tion. For example, a foreign national might come to the United States
to study Greek philosophy, and upon receiving a degree be refused an
exit permit on the ground that he possesses and is likely to disclose in-
formation concerning the national defense of the United States. The
Government often has maintained that it cannot divulge the evidence on
which it bases the restriction of an alleged right asserted by the petitioner
because disclosure of its confidential sources of information would be in-
volved.6 ' In Knauff v. Shaughnessy"2 the Supreme Court held that an
excluded alien was not entitled to disclosure of the specific charges on
which the action taken against her was based, and in Bailey v. Richardson 
6 3
the Court divided four to four in reviewing the denial by the Court of
45. See Han-Lee-Mao v. Brownell, 207 F.2d 142, 145 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
46. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) ; Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S.
537 (1950) ; Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924). See also Shaughnessy v. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206 (1953).
47. See Han-Lee-Mao v. Brownell, 207 F.2d 142, 145 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
48. Ibid.
49. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953), citing with approval,
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (concurring opinion): ". . . [O]nce
an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes invested with the
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. . . ." See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (Fourteenth Amendment); Comment, 67 HARv. L. Rxv. 341
(1953).
50. Brief for Appellant, p. 24, Han-Lee-Mao v. Brownell, 207 F.2d 142 (D.C.
Cir. 1953).
51. See N.Y. Times, March 4, 1955, p. 14, col. 3; Elder v. United States, 202
F.2d 465, 469 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Parker v. Lester, 112 F. Supp. 433, 443 (N.D. Cal.
1953); Hoover, A Comment on the Article "Loyalty Among Government Em-
ployees," 58 Y=sE L.J. 401, 404 (1949).
52. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
53. 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
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Appeals for the District of Columbia of a similar right asserted by a Gov-
ernment employee.5 4  However, both cases are distinguishable from the
detained aliens situation; in Knauff the Court said that an alien who is out-
side the country is not entitled to due process, and in Bailey the circuit
court held that Government employment is neither life, liberty nor prop-
erty within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Although the right
to a full and fair hearing would not in itself entitle an alien to the specific
reasons for his detention,5 5 it seems that he should be given this informa-
tion unless the Government can prove that to do so would hamper its
system of obtaining security information. Normally this harm could be
avoided because in most cases it probably would be possible to disclose the
specific charges against the alien without disclosing their source.5 6
Since the requirement of a hearing conforming to due process would
not alone afford the alien sufficient protection, he also would be entitled to
judicial determination of whether the particular hearing accorded him was
a full and fair one under the circumstances 7 However, it is not clear
whether judicial control will extend beyond this point to a review on the
facts of the executive's final decision. Neither the language nor the legis-
lative history of the McCarran Act is of any aid in ascertaining Congres-
sional intent.58 Since detention is a matter committed by statute to agency
discretion,59 judicial review under Section 10 of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act '0 appears to be unavailable. In addition, the courts are very
reluctant to interfere with political action by the executive branch.01 How-
ever, where judicial review is not expressly negatived by the applicable
54. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
55. The requirements for a fair hearing vary according to the circumstances of
each case. FCC v. WJR, The Goodwill Station, Inc., 337 U.S. 265 (1949).
56. See Donovan & Jones, Program for a Democratic Counter Attack to Com-
munist Penetration of Govertment Service, 58 YALE L.J. 1211, 1235 (1949). See
also Parker v. Lester, 112 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
57. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945). See United States ex rel. Vajtauer
v. Commissioner, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927).
58. In deportation cases both prior to and after the Administrative Procedure
Act, the Supreme Court has limited judicial review to habeas corpus proceedings
because the immigration statute prior to 1952 stated that the Attorney General's order
shall be "final." See Note, The Right to Judicial Review of Deportatim Ordero
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 62 YALE L.J. 1000 (1953). Habeas corpus
would not be available to detained aliens because they are free to move about the
country and thus are not "in custody" as required by the Judicial Code. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (1952). See Lynch v. Hershey, 208 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 917 (1954). But cf. Ex parte Fabiani, 105 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
59. See note 40 supra.
60. 60 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1952).
61. In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952), the Court said: "How-
ever desirable world-wide amelioration of the lot of aliens, we think it is peculiarly
a subject for international diplomacy. It should not be initiated by judicial decision
which can only deprive our own government of a power of defense and reprisal with-
out obtaining for American citizens abroad any reciprocal privileges or immunities.
Reform in thig field must be entrusted to the branches of the Government in control
of our international relations and treaty-making powers." Id. at 591. See also
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1953). See generally United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
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statute, courts sometimes will assume that Congress could not have in-
tended to invest the agency with an absolute discretion, and some measure
of review on the facts will be granted.62 Also, the judiciary will review
and reverse a decision when it is shown that the administrator acted out-
side the scope of authority granted him by the statute and the implementing
regulations.6 The courts could apply these doctrines to establish their re-
viewing power in the detention cases. Since detention infringes the alien's
right to leave the country and imposes a grave hardship, courts will prob-
ably realize the need for controlling administrative discretion in this area
and will thus grant some measure of review on the facts.
However, it is difficult to predict the scope which the judicial review
will assume. It is no doubt desirable that there be some form of control
over an agency which has the power to deprive an alien of his basic right
to leave the country. But the bases for detention involve political deter-
minations as to security matters and their relation to the nation's defense
policy. These are essentially executive concerns, and the check on these
activities lies with the voting public. A prompt check is needed only when
the executive acts arbitrarily, and the judiciary is properly equipped to
serve this function. To perform this, courts need not weigh the evidence
and make an independent finding; it is sufficient if they require the adminis-
trator to have before him some evidence to support his conclusion. This
is the doctrine followed by the United States Supreme Court in the
analogous deportation field,6 4 and there appears to be no reason why the
same formula should not be applied in the detention cases.
CONCLUSION
The refusal to permit aliens to return to their native lands has been one
of the practices employed by the United States in the effort to deal with
the novel international problems which have arisen in the present era of
indefinite national emergency. Although there are no settled principles of
international law to guide action in a period which cannot be termed either
"wartime" or "peacetime," one can predict with some assurance that in-
ternational law will not condone wholesale detention. The administration
of the standard "prejudicial to the interests of the United States" must be
accomplished always with the thought that detention in the absence of a
declared war is a harsh, unprecedented method. However, since the de-
tention policy is a discretionary, political one, the judiciary should inter-
vene only to test the constitutionality of the applicable statute and to insure
that action under the statute is neither arbitrary nor outside the authority
delegated to the administrator by Congress. Checks on this type of political
action should come from the body politic.
62. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1951); see DAvis, ADMINISTRATVE LAW
821-31 (1951).
63. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) ; Mahler v. Eby, 269 U.S. 32 (1924).
64. United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U.S. 103 (1927) ; Tisi
v. Todd, 264 U.S. 131 (1924). See also Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
